47A. How well did the limited partner and LLC investors
fare in such ventures?
47B. Did they recoup their original investment? Yes No
47C. Did they receive a fair return on their investment? Yes No
47D. Could the financial results for such investors have been predicted based on available knowledge
of the business practices of film distributors?
48. If the results of such investments were disappointing and
could have been predicted does that mean that attorneys and broker/dealers
who participated in such offerings were negligent in the conduct of their
due diligence activities and in providing fair disclosures on behalf of the
producers to the prospective investors?
49. How many U.S. films are financed each year using
the negative pickup financing arrangement? How many U.S. films are
financed each year using the negative pickup arrangement with major
studio/distributors? How many U.S. films are financed each year using the
negative pickup arrangement with independent distributors?
50A. In your understanding, how does the negative pickup deal work and
what is required in order to put such a film financing arrangement
together?
50B. How does a negative pickup deal differ from a pure acquisition?
A fractured rights deal? A split rights deal? A rent-a-distributor
transaction?
51A. How many U.S. made films are produced each
year utilizing the limited partnership or limited liability company (LLC)
to raise all or a significant portion of the production funds?
51B. How many of those were financed through the use of a public/registered limited
partnership such as the Star Partners (MGM/UA) and Silver Screen Partners
(Disney) series?
51C. How many of those were financed through the use of privately placed
limited partnership?
51D. How many of the LLCs were sold as non-securities?
52. What can be done to prevent the major studio/distributors from avoiding the higher costs of below-the-line union
wages and fringes through the use of the "artificial pickup"?
53. During the past 10 years, how many films distributed by the major studio/distributors fall into the following film
finance/distribution scenarios:
(1) in-house production/distribution?
(2) production-financing/distribution agreements (with independent producers)?
(3) negative pickups?
(4) pure acquisition deals?
(5) rent-a-distributor deals?
54. What trends relating to these 5 forms of film finance and
distribution appear to be developing?
55. What percentage of feature films produced in the U.S. each year appear to be financed with money provided by elements of organized crime?
56. Are such investment opportunities being utilized to launder money?
57. How difficult do you feel it is to get a handle on what is really going on in Hollywood without accurate numbers or statistics?
58. How many pitches of concepts or ideas are made to major studio/distributors each year?
59. How many synopses, treatments and scripts are submitted to the major studio/distributors each year?
60. How many synopses and/or treatments are registered with the WGA each year?
61. How many screenplays are registered with the WGA each year?
62. How many screenplays are registered with the U.S. Copyright office each year?
63. Looking at the above numbers, would you say the system is out of balance or that it simply must develop this amount of product to obtain a certain level of quality control?
64. What are the realistic odds that a pitched film project will result in a major studio development deal?
65. What are the realistic odds that a film being developed by a major studio/distributor will receive
a "green light" for production?
66. What are the comparative odds of taking a
film project to a major studio/distributor for development and production
financing, as opposed to obtaining a negative pickup deal arrangement, a
pure acquisition deal, or investor financing, or some of the other forms of
production financing?
67. How many U.S. films have been produced each year
by independent producers during the last ten years?
68. What is the trend with respect to the number of independently produced films?
69. How many of the U.S. films produced by independent producers are distributed by major studio/distributors each
year?
70. How many of such films are distributed by independent distributors?
71. How many of such films do not obtain a domestic theatrical release?
72. What are the trends with respect to these questions?
73. How many U.S. made films are produced each year with a
substantial portion of the production costs financed through bank or other
lending entity loans?
74. What percentage are negative pickup deals?
75. What percentage are so-called foreign pre-sales?
76. What percentage of the pre-sales are "fractionalized rights" deals?
77. What percentage of the pre-sales are so-called "splits rights" deals?
78. How many involve so-called "gap financing"?
79. What are the trends, (e.g., are more negative pickup and pre-sales deals being effected each year than production-financing/distribution deals)?
80. How many U.S. made films are produced each year using a
completion bond?
81. What is the aggregate amount of film budgets covered by
completion bonds in a given year?
82. How many completion guarantors currently
operate in the marketplace?
83. What fees do they charge?
84. How many films covered by completion bonds are actually taken over by the completion
guarantor in some way?
85. What percentage of domestic theatrical box
office gross has been generated in the past 10 years by U.S. films produced
and distributed by major studio/distributors?
86. What percentage of domestic theatrical box office gross has been generated in the past 10 years by U.S.
films produced by independent producers and distributed by major
studio/distributors?
87. What percentage of domestic
theatrical box office gross has been generated in the past 10 years by U.S.
films produced by independent producers but distributed by independent
distributors?
88. How many U.S. films involve awards of some form of gross participation to others besides the domestic theatrical distributor, (e.g., writers, directors, producers, actors, etc.)?
89. How many such deals provide for net profit participations?
90. What percentage of these deals actually result in the payment of gross or net profit participations?
91A. What business practices do you feel the major studio/distributors have engaged in to
gain their power over the rest of the industry?
91B. What do you feel is the key to understanding the Hollywood-based U.S. film
industry?
92A. How many independent film distribution or production companies have gone out of business in the last 5 years and why?
92B. Is it because they failed to produce hit films, poor financial planning, or is it because of unethical or unfair,
business practices of the major studio/distributors?
93A. Would it be fair to characterize all, or a significant portion, of the feature film distribution agreements between major studio/distributors and independent producers as contracts of adhesion?
93B. What percentage of such contracts, in your opinion, contain unconscionable provisions?
93C. Are these agreements enforceable in the courts?
94. Which, if any, of the terms of the production-financing/distribution agreements used by the major
studio/distributors are likely to be considered unconscionable by courts if challenged?
95A. Do the distribution agreements of the MPAA companies regularly exclude revenue from the gross receipts revenue stream of independently produced motion pictures for the purpose of then
contributing such moneys to favored charities?
95B. If so, do these MPAA companies then deduct such contributions from their U.S. federal income
taxes? Comment?
95C. How much money is diverted from the gross receipts revenue stream of independently produced motion pictures during the course of a given year in this manner and what charities are being favored with such
contributions?
95D. Approximately how much money do feature film gross and net profit participants lose each year through this distributor gross receipts exclusion?
95E. If such exclusion provisions are contained in the film distribution agreements of MPAA companies are they unconscionable?
95F. What other revenues are excluded from the definition of gross receipts by the language of the major studio/distributor distribution agreements?
95G. Are such exclusions reasonable?
96A. Of those U.S. films granting some form of gross participation to others besides the distributor, do any involve a
gross participation in pure gross distributor rentals?
96B. What are the various levels of gross revenues made available to gross profit
participants?
97. Of those U.S. films granting some form of gross participation to others besides the
distributor, how many involve a gross participation in some form of
adjusted or accountable gross distributor rentals and how are such terms
defined?
98A. If the major studio/distributors stopped granting gross participations to actors, directors, producers,
screenwriters and others wouldn't that substantially reduce the production
costs of such motion pictures and at the same time increase the value of
net profit participations, thus making all of such persons much more
willing to accept net profit participations? Comments?
98B. Why are gross profit participations considered production costs?
98C. Is that a fair characterization?
99. Is it fair to say that the major studio/distributors actually prefer to grant gross profit participations on
some films because gross participations are included as part of the
negative cost and thus increase the amount of interest the major
studio/distributor earns on the project, while at the same time the
granting of gross participations do not otherwise decrease the major
studio/distributor's earnings on a film although gross participations have
a devastating effect on net profit participants?
100A. What percentage of U.S. films distributed each year that do
achieve net profits are audited?
100B. What percentage of U.S. films distributed
each year that do achieve net profits do not achieve net profits until
after they are audited?
100C. Of those films that are audited, how many provide
for the recovery of a significantly larger amount of net profits than would
have otherwise been reported were it not for the audit?
101. Do feature film distributors owe a fiduciary duty to independent producers and other net profit participants to avoid
settling with exhibitors for less than the contractually owed amount of
film rentals?
102. Is the failure of feature film distributors to refuse to settle with exhibitors for less than the
contractually owned amount of distributor rentals (thus excluding
significant amounts of revenue from distributor gross receipts) a violation
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
103. Is the failure of a major studio affiliated distributor to settle with an exhibitor for the contractual
amount of film rentals due to such distributor an anti-competitive practice
designed to prevent independent producers from effectively competing with
the studio production companies?
104. Is this practice a violation of the
federal Sherman antitrust Act, the Clayton Act and/or the FTC Act?
105. Is the distributor protected from claims alleging that the settlement transaction
is illegal because it is not mentioned in the distribution agreement; even
if the distribution agreement is a contract of adhesion?
106A. Should exhibitor/distributor settlement transactions be outlawed?
106B. Which major studio/distributors engage in settlement transactions with exhibitors and which do not?
106C. If a major studio/distributor is not willing to settle for less gross receipts than
owed by the exhibitor to the distributor does this have any effect on the
ability of that studio/distributor to get its movies shown in those same
theatres in the future?
106D. In the course of a given year, how much money is diverted annually from the gross receipts revenue stream that might ultimately accrue to the benefit of all gross and net profit participants
of independently produced films by virtue of the settlement transaction?
106E. On what legal grounds can motion picture gross and net profit participants
attack the settlement transaction as between exhibitors and distributors?
107A. After a comparison of distribution expenses in major studio distribution deals could one conclude there are any differences between the definitions found in the production-financing/distribution agreement as opposed to negative pickup deals or pure acquisition deals?
107B. Given the existence of such differences, what are the possible reasons?
107C. In other words, why would an expense be considered a distribution expense in one distribution deal but a
production expense in another?
107D. Could the answer to the above questions relate to who put up the production money and who is getting paid interest and production overhead charges based on those funds?
108. Should entities such as film distributors who pay foreign remittance taxes on revenues generated from the exhibition of their films in such foreign countries be allowed to claim the U.S. foreign tax
credit when the amount paid in taxes is charged against the gross receipts
of the distributor as a distributor expense and is thus actually paid by
the net profit participants?
109A. What firm or firms provide motion picture box office
checking services?
109B. exactly what services do they provide?
109C. what kinds of
exhibitor (or distributor) practices are they trying to prevent?
109D. who hires
them?
109E. what are their fees and on what percentage of films are they used?
110. What is the difference between rebates,
discounts and kickbacks and how can independent feature film producers
protect themselves from abuse in this area?
111. Should film distributors be allowed to exercise
their discretion with respect to making expense and revenue allocations:
(A) among films being licensed or syndicated together as a package in a foreign
territory, to networks or independent television stations?
(B) relating to the costs of advertising several films?
(C) with respect to which portion of film rentals should be considered earned by their shorts and trailers as
opposed to an independently produced feature film?
112. What system is used in the current marketplace for determining which exhibitors will be able to exhibit which feature films?
113 Who benefits from the current system?
114. Explain the distributor practice of blind bidding, discuss
the pros and cons of the practice and identify which film industry groups
favor the practice and which are opposed to it?
115A. Which states currently have anti-blind bidding statutes and which do not?
115B. Have the major studio/distributors carried out their reported threats to reduce the number
of location shoots in the so-called regulatory states, (i.e., those states
that have passed anti-blind bidding statutes)?
115C. Should a federal anti-blind
bidding statute be considered by Congress?
115D. Is blind-bidding still a
problem?
115E. Did the exhibitors and the major studio/distributors cut a deal
which caused the exhibitors to back off their efforts to pass anti-blind
bidding legislation in more states?
115F. Did this supposed "deal" involve a
promise by the major studio/distributors to halt purchases of ownership
interests in major theatre exhibition chains?
116. Are the independent producers whose
films have been distributed on a rent-a-distributor basis satisfied with
the manner in which their films were distributed, (i.e., does the inherent
distributor conflict of interest situation in which a distributor may be
distributing one of its own films at the same time that it is distributing
a film produced by an independent producer result in discriminatory
treatment of the independently produced film)?
117A. How many U.S. films are obtained each year by
the major studio/distributors as pure acquisition deals?
117B. How many U.S.
films are obtained each year by the independent distributors by
acquisition?
118A. How many U.S. films are distributed each
year on a rent-a-distributor basis?
118B. What portion of the distribution
expenses in these rent-a-distributor deals have been paid for by monies
provided by the non-distributor financier?
119A. Is there any reason why directors, producers or stars of
studio-financed films that were considered "commercial failures" would not be willing to talk openly about the
performance of the film or how the studio handled distribution?
119B. Are directors, producers or stars of studio films cowed?
120A. Are the shareholders of the major studio/distributors
treated more or less fairly than net profit participants?
120B. If Orion owner John Kluge is one of this country's most wealthy individuals, while at the
same time his company was in bankruptcy, was it fair to raise the question
as to whether the shareholders of Orion had been properly compensated for
their ownership interests?
120C. Who are the majority shareholders of the major
studio/distributors?
121A. Are distributor rentals for films produced and distributed
by major studio/distributors consistently higher than the distributor
rentals for films produced by independent producers, but distributed by
major studio/distributors?
121B. If so, what causes this difference?
121C. Do the
major studio/distributors negotiate better terms in their agreements with
exhibitors on their own films?
121D. Or do the major studio/distributors
discriminate against independent producers by settling for a smaller amount
of film rentals on the independently produced films that they distribute?
122A. What percentage of U.S. films distributed each year
achieve net profits?
122B. By major studio/distributors?
122C. By independent distributors?
123. Why can't the screenwriter, director and actor
guilds get the major studio/distributors to agree to collective bargaining
agreements which prohibit:
(A) unfair settlement transactions?
(B) the granting of gross profit participations?
(C) unfair home video royalty
provisions?
(D) distributor participation in net profits?
(E) unreasonable allocations in package sales and other unreasonable distributor business
practices?
the elimination of which would greatly increase the chances that
a given movie will generate net profits for the benefit of such directors,
screenwriters and actors (i.e., the members of these guilds)? Your comments on all or part of A-E?
124. Is it feasible that independent producers form an
effective association of independent feature film producers and work toward
the same important financial goal, (i.e., the elimination of predatory
distributor business practices which significantly decrease the chances of
the vast majority of motion pictures for generating net profits)?
125A. What is the history of U.S. anti-trust law enforcement
in the motion picture business?
125B. What were the Paramount Consent Decrees
and how are they currently implemented, (i.e., what is left of the
Paramount Consent Decrees)?
125C. Did the Paramount Consent Decrees actually do
much harm to the major studio/distributors?
125D. Did the decrees achieve their
goals?
125E. Provide an objective presentation of the arguments of the major
studio/distributors and the independent film community with respect to
current antitrust issues.
126. Has the policy of the U.S. Justice Department
toward enforcement of the federal antitrust laws in the motion picture
industry been relaxed in the past few decades and why?
127. In 1986, the Reagan administration asked Congress to make the
most significant reforms in antitrust law in decades. The Reagan proposals
raised controversial issues relating to when and how the government should
intervene in the marketplace. The administration's legislative package
primarily sought to facilitate mergers and to reduce the penalties for
certain economic practices that could cost violators millions under current
law. What happened to this reform effort?
128A. Is it true that the American feature-film industry
has shown a tendency toward monopoly, oligopoly or a shared monopoly
throughout its history and if so, why?
128B. Would such activities be actionable
under the present U.S. antitrust laws if they were vigorously enforced by
the U.S. Justice Department?
129. Do the activities of the MPAA companies constitute an illegal
cartel?
130. What effect does vertical integration of the major
studio/distributors have on the independent producers, distributors,
exhibitors and movie-going audiences?
131A. What is the effect of the re-entry of the major
studio/distributors into the field of motion picture exhibition on
independent exhibitors?
131B. On independent distributors?
131C. On independent
producers?
131D. How does such re-entry affect the movie-going public?
131E. How many theatres and/or screens or owned or partly owned by major
studio/distributors?
132. What are the inter-relationships through
common ownership of the motion picture studio, production company,
distributor, video, cable and television entities?
133A. How can the distributor practice of block booking be
prevented as between a distributor and a theatre chain that is either owned
or controlled by that distributor?
133B. How does the so-called blockbuster
strategy differ from block booking?
134A. What are tipical financial and creative results of movies that have been packaged by agencies?
134B. What agencies do most of the packaging for the MPAA companies?
134C. Also, what percentages of MPAA releases are packaged deals?
134D. Which studios release the most packaged films each year?
134E. How do the packaged films
perform at the box office?
134F. Does agency packaging violate antitrust laws?
135A. What are the existing ownership relationships between the
various entities in the home video arena?
135B. What film production entities, are affiliates with film distributors?
135C. Which distributors are associated with affiliate or subsidiary video
manufacturing entities?
135D. Which of the manufacturers are affiliated with wholesale distributors and which wholesale distributors are affiliated with retail outlets?
136. The studios, in dividing up each dollar received from home video (and laser
video disc) sales and rentals, assigned an arbitrary share of 20% of the
total as profits. Those profits are the amount later used to calculate how
much will be paid to profit participants in a movie or TV program. That
means if an actor or director or writer is to get 10% of the net profits,
they are actually getting 10% of the 20%. It is one of those issues that
frequently raises cries of 'creative accounting.'" What Hollywood lawyers, agents and studio
business affairs executives call 'the 20% rule?'
137. Federal Judge John Singleton issued a directed
verdict of insufficient evidence against defendants Columbia, 20th Century
Fox, Warner Bros., United Artists, Buena Vista, General Cinema, ABC
Theaters (now Cineplex Odeon/Plitt), Interstate Theaters and Loews. They
had been accused by Universal Amusement Company and its subsidiary,
Entertainment Projects, of illegal product-splitting, unlawful clearances,
monopolistic practices, limitation of prints and distributor-circuit
collusion. The Houston-based theatre circuit had sought $1.9 million in
damages. What is your analysis of the
issues involved.
138A. Steven Bach reported in his book Final
Cut that "black books" containing " . . . columns of figures earned by each
picture released by each major company . . . were exchanged on a monthly
courtesy basis by the several chief executive officers (of the major
studio/distributors) and were privileged and confidential: bottom-line
numbers, picture by picture, month by month, dollar by dollar." Does this
practice continue today?
138B. Are these numbers significantly different from
what appears from time to time in the trades or other articles about the
movie industry?
138C. Are they different than the numbers reported to the IRS
and the motion picture corporate stockholders?
138D. Does this secret exchange of information among competitors run afoul of the antitrust laws?
139A. What is the ratio of major studio/distributor rentals
to box office gross receipts for any given year expressed in the form of a
percentage?
139B. Does that ratio vary with respect to the films produced and
released by the major studio/distributors as opposed to the ratio for films
produced by independent producers but released by the major
studio/distributors?
139C. If so, what is the difference in those ratios?
139D. How
much money is involved on an annual basis?
139E. Assuming there is a difference,
why would such ratio differ for studio productions as compared to
independent productions? Are any anti-competitive practices involved?
140A. In your opinion, do the major studio/distributors engage in any anti-competitive
behavior and if so, what?
140B. In ypour opinion, does the practice of agency package violate the U.S. antitrust
laws?
141A. Who controls (owns and/or manages) the top ten U.S. theatrical
distributors?
141B. How many theatres and screens does each firm control?
141C. To what extent do the major studio/distributors have ownership interests in
such theatre chains?
141D. Does their ownership interest give them a competitive
advantage over independent distributors that do not have similar interests
in theatres?
142. In your opinion, have any of the business practices of the
major studio/distributors which amount to a pattern of racketeering been
used to attempt to control a relevant market, thus creating an antitrust
law violation in addition to the RICO violation?
143. In your opinion, do any of the business practices of the major
studio/distributors fall within the federal RICO definition of racketeering
activity, (i.e. constitute bribery, mail fraud, wire fraud or extortion)?
144. In your opinion, do any of the business practices of the major studio/distributors
constitute an illegal pattern of racketeering under the federal RICO
statute?
145. In your opinion, do any of the business practices of the major studio/distributors
involve gifts, offers or promises of anything of value made to any federal
official with the intent of influencing any federal official or any
official act, thus falling within the federal bribery statute?
146. To your knowledge, have any plaintiff's (writers, directors,
actors, producers, attorneys or any other person) been injured in their
business or property by reason
of a pattern of racketeering activity committed by a major
studio/distributor enterprise that engages in or affects interstate
commerce and that invests in or operates the organization with its
ill-gotten funds?
147. In your opinion, do any of the business practices of the major
studio/distributors involve a victim's reasonable fear, under the
circumstances of losing property (including business accounts, franchises
or unrealized profits) unless he or she complies with the major
studio/distributor's (extortionist's) demands, thus falling within the
federal extortion statute?
148. In your opinion, do any of the business practices of the major
studio/distributors involve a use of the mails or use of wire, radio or
television communications to obtain money or property by a scheme or
artifice to defraud, (i.e., violate a standard of moral uprightness,
fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing in the general and
business life of members of society), thus coming within the RICO
definitions of mail or wire fraud?
149. To your knowledge, have any claims under RICO and Section 1 of the Sherman Act been
successfully asserted by film industry plaintiffs? The Clayton Act? The
FTC Act? Against film industry defendants and otherwise?
150. Is the judgment of three people who have
proclaimed over the years that the Hollywood establishment has a proclivity
for wrongdoing (a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, a judge that administered the
Paramount Consent Decrees and a litigating attorney) a fair overall
assessment of the business practices and behavior of the Hollywood control
group? [see Politics, Movies and the Role of Government, along with
Hollywood Corruption]
151. Should the U.S. Congress consider specific legislation,
(e.g., "The Motion Picture Industry Fair Practices Act") which would be
designed to prohibit certain unfair, unethical, predatory, anti-competitive
and/or illegal business practices of motion picture distributors and others
in this industry?
152. Should federal and state policies encourage or discourage a
broader participation of interest groups in the production, distribution
and exhibition of U.S. made motion pictures?
153A. Is it fair to characterize the U.S.
motion picture business as an entertainment industry or a communications
industry, or should it be considered both?
153B. Does the answer to the former
question have any implications with respect to governmental policies which
affect the motion picture business, (e.g., governmental policy relating to
such issues as vertical integration, block booking, blind bidding,
settlement transactions, etc.)?
154. What special tax benefits the studios have been
able to lobby through Congress from time to time?
155. Which high level executives of the MPAA companies
(and/or their spouses) have made significant political campaign
contributions to U.S. Presidential candidates in the last several
elections, how much and to whom?
156. Is there any relationship between such
contributions and the shift in U.S. antitrust policy in the U.S. Justice
Department?
157A. What issues has the MPAA lobbied for and against in Congress
during the past ten years?
157B. What issues has the MPAA lobbied for and
against in state legislatures around the country?
157C. What issues has the MPAA
lobbied for and against at the federal regulatory agencies such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Trade Commission and the
Federal Communications Commission?
157D. What issues has the MPAA lobbied for and
against at the federal law enforcement agencies such as the Internal
Revenue Service and the U.S. Justice Department?
157E. Is their a relationship
between which issues are of importance to the MPAA and where their PAC
money goes?
158. What special tax laws have the MPAA companies lobbied for during
the past decade and what special tax benefits are enjoyed by the major
studio/distributors?
159. What is the history of political activism in Hollywood, among
studio executives and motion picture stars?
160. What are the main industry issues of concern to the National
Association of Theatre Owners?
161A. What issues of concern to the Motion Picture Association of
America come within the purview of the U.S. Congress?
161B. Briefly discuss each
and identify which parties are on both sides of such issues?
162. How does the policy of the governments of other
countries as such policy is directed toward their film industries differ
from the policy of the U.S. government as it relates to the U.S. film
industry?
163. What is the role, if any, of federal and state
governments in ensuring that all interest groups have a fair opportunity to
participate in the production, distribution and exhibition of U.S. made
motion pictures?
164A. What organizations, if any, represent
the interests of the independent feature film producer in this industry?
164B. Evaluate whether such organizations effectively represent such interests.
Can any existing producer organization be truly considered an advocacy or
lobby group?
164C. Does any group primarily focus its efforts on behalf of
independent feature film producers?
164D. Why haven't independent feature film
producers organized into an effective professional association in an
attempt to protect their interests on vital issues that significantly
effect the well-being of independent producers?
165. In what significant ways do the various U.S. film
industry organizations protect the interests of such organizations'
members, (e.g., professional and trade associations and guilds)?
166. Is it possible that all net profit participants of motion
pictures released by the major studio/distributors or any single major
studio/distributor within the period permitted by the statute of
limitations could be certified as a class for purposes of litigating a
class action lawsuit against such distributors based on unconscionability,
antitrust, RICO and/or fraud allegations?
167A. Is it too late to file a class action lawsuit on
behalf of all of the limited partner investors who invested in the Star
Partners or Silver Screen Partners public limited partnership film
offerings?
167B . What theories of liability may be utilized in such a law suit:
(1) securities fraud? (2) unconscionability, (3) antitrust law violations?
(4) RICO violations? What other causes of action might be fairly alleged?
168A. What is true history of the beginnings
of the movie business and then Hollywood?
168B. Is there any evidence to suggest
that some historians of the movie business tend to confuse the two in an
effort to rewrite such histories?
168C. What is the evidence that the original
invention of the motion picture projector was stolen from its inventor?
168D. Who was the real inventor of the motion picture projector?
168E. Was Hollywood
created primarily in an effort by the independent producers of the day to
break the Edison trust?
168F. Were the activities of the early Hollywood
independent producers illegal at the time?
169. What responsibility, if any, do producers have in
advising moviegoers as to what portion of their movie is considered
factual, what is arguable and what is purely fiction?
170 . If a motion picture is about an historical event,
does the filmmaker have a greater obligation to be truthful to his or her
best ability?
171A. What are the demographics of the Academy membership and how
do such characteristics influence Academy voting?
171B. How does someone become a member of the Academy and do Academy
membership admission policies affect the Academy Award voting?
171C. Approximately what portion of the Academy voters are voting
on motion pictures they have never seen?
171D. What is the economic result of an Academy Award
nomination or win and how widespread is the practice of hiring people to
influence Academy members voting?
171E. Is it true that the Academy voters are more
interested in nominating successful movies that can still be "helped" as
opposed to honoring unsuccessful movies or those that have already passed
through the video supermarkets?
171F. Is it true that the Academy generally honors films of the last
quarter of the year?
172A. Why are some film industry executives and creative talent
paid such high salaries?
172B. Are such high salaries really a true reflection
of the market or has an artificial market been created in the interest of
Hollywood insiders?
173A. What kinds of incidents have been covered up?
173B. Who is involved in the cover-ups, studio
executives, law enforcement officials and/or others?
174. How do film industry corporations cheat their shareholders?
175. Is it fair to say that the so-called motion picture trade publications, (e.g., The Hollywood Reporter,
The Daily Variety, etc.) do not provide adequate critical analyses of the motion picture industry, (i.e.,
they primarily publish the "good news" about their major advertisers the
major studio/distributors)?
176. Which source of motion picture industry information
relating to box office performance and industry economics is the most
current and reliable: Paul Kagan and Associates, The Hollywood Reporter,
The Daily Variety, Variety, the Goldman Sachs annual Investment Research
Report on the Movie Industry, The Motion Picture Almanac, Baseline, NATO's
Encyclopedia of Exhibition, Harold Vogel's book Entertainment Industry
Economics, The Ernst & Young Entertainment Business Journal, Art Murphy's
Boxoffice Register or some other source? Why?
177A. When is an independent producer no
longer independent?
177B. What is your exact definition of an Independent Producer?
178A. Do some film critics generally provide more favorable reviews for
the releases of the major studio/distributors than the releases of the
independent distributors? Give examples.
178B. Do some of the film industry critics seem
to prefer the work of certain actors, directors or writers because of the
racial, ethnic or cultural identity of such persons? Give examples
179. Is there a positive correlation between the
amount of money spent on advertising a motion picture and its performance
at the box office?
180A. Is it true, as reported in the April 1991 issue of American
Film magazine that " . . . film-study programs graduate 26,000 students
every year . . . " and that " . . . only 5 to 10 percent of the 26,000
students actually find their way into the industry . . . " after
graduating?
180B. What responsibilities do our colleges and universities have
for achieving a more reasonable balance between the number of students they
accept in these glamour film programs and the number of realistic job
opportunities that exist in the film industry? Is this a national scandal?